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Abstract
Amodel of majority rule is developed in which each of a finite number of
generations votes on a redistribution of income between itself and the
other generations. In voting, each generation expresses tastes for its own
income and for the equality of income across generations. The model is
then used to derive the conditions under which discounting is justified
namely those conditions for which the majority rule exhibits a positive
marginal rate of time preference. It is demonstrated that when each
generation is wealthier than those preceding it, the parameters
representing the taste for income equality must be relatively high for the
majority rule to exhibit a positive marginal rate of time preference.
* I thank Martin J. Bailey, Charles C. Brown, John K. Hill, William T•
Long III, Martin C. McGuire, Gerald P. O'Driscoll Jr., Joe Oppenheimer,
James E. Pearce and Eugenie D. Short for their valuable comments and
suggestions. The views expressed are mine and do not necessarily
reflect those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas or the Federal
Reserve System.1. Introduction
Economists have long been concerned that discounting may be unfair to
future generations. Early writers were concerned that discounting could
result in too little capital being transferred forward to future
generations.11 More recently, the literature in environmental and natural
resource economics has drawn attention to the possibility that discounting
could result in an insufficient preservation of natural resources and
environmental amenities for future generations.gl
Not all economists agree that discounting is unfair. In his defense of
the use of discounting to evaluate intergenerational transfers, Gordon
Tullock (1964) argued that one need not worry about the effect of
discounting when evaluating intergenerational transfers because future
generations are going to be wealthier than the present generation.
I take the approach that the fairness of discounting is a property of
an ethically appealing intergenerational social welfare function or social
choice rule. Specifically, discounting is justified if the selected social
welfare function or social choice rule exhibits a positive marginal rate of
time preference for the intergenerational distributions in question. In
the context of my approach, Tullock's argument can be seen as the adoption
of an ethically appealing social welfare function or social choice rule
that exhibits a positive marginal rate of time preference for all income
distributions in which each generation is wealthier than those preceding
it·11- 2 -
In this article, I develop a model of intergenerational majority rule
and use it to derive conditions under which discounting is justified by the
expectation that each generation is wealthier than those preceding it. The
model extends inquiry along a line that Koichi Hamada (1973) first explored
in an intragenerational context. The model is a simple majority rule in
which the equality of income across generations is a public good and each
generation votes on the amount of the public good to be provided through
tax-financed redistribution. In voting, each generation ranks the
alternative distributions on the basis of its own utility. I then use a
revealed preference technique on the resulting majority rule to determine
what individual taste parameters will result in a positive· marginal rate of
time preference when each generation is wealthier than those preceding it.
A model of majority rule has analytical and ethical appeal:
Interpersonal utility comparisons, which most economists consider
objectionable, are eliminated. Discounting is not imposed on the social
choice rule because each generation receives equal weight under majority
voting. Nevertheless, the majority rule evaluates the distribution of
income and exhibits a positive marginal rate of time preference under
specific distributional and taste assumptions.
Knowing what tastes must be assumed to yield a majority rule that
exhibits a positive marginal rate preference provides insight into the
consistency between current tastes and Tullock's justification for
discounting. Furthermore, this knowledge may reveal how future generations
will view intergenerational allocation decisions that the present
generation has justified on the basis of efficient discounting.•
- 3 -
The remainder of the discussion is organized as follows: In section 2,
I develop a model of intergenerational majority rule over the distribution
of income: In section 3, I derive the tastes for which the majority rule
will exhibit a positive marginal rate of time preference for all
distributions in which each generation is wealthier than those preceding
it. Section 4 is the conclusion.
2. Intergenerational Majority Rule Over the Distribution of Income
The model is a simple majority rule in which the equality of income
across generations is a public good and each of a finite number of
non-overlapping generations votes on the amount of the public good to be
provided through redistribution. Inquiry is simplified -- but the essence
of the intergenerational problem is retained if each generation is
represented as a single individual.~/ Although majority rule does not
maximize the utility of all generations, in voting, each generation ranks
the alternative distributions of income on the basis of its own utility.
Differences in the desired quantity of the public good are resolved in
a majority rule that maximizes the utility of the generation whose most
preferred amount of the public good is median. This median generation is a
future generation.
2.1 Individual utility
For ~ generations, the utility of each generation is described as a
function of its own income and of the distribution of income across
generations.- 4 -
U. = l[5X-P + (1-5)y.-PJ-1/ p for = 1, 2, ... , n. (1)
, 1
in which l is a constant multiplier
5 is the intensity of desire for income equality,
X is a measure of the distribution of income across
generations and is a public good as as conceived by
Lester Thurow (1971),
(1-5) is each generation's intensity of desire for its
own income,
Yi is the income of the ith generation, and
P = (1-0)/0, where 0 is the elasticity of
substitution.y
Individual utility is described with the common C.E.S. function to allow
identification of the tastes for X and Yi in terms of the function's
parameters.
2.2 Measuring the income distribution
A simple and general approach to measuring the equality of income is to
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the income assignments are numbered such that Y1'" Y2 '"
Y3'" ... '" Yn' and
the weights are invariant to any changes in income.6/- 5 -
This measure of the income distribution has the properties usually
associated with egalitarian ideals. In the absence of redistribution
costs, a more equal distribution of a given amount of total income yields a
higher value of X than does a less equal distribution of the same total
income. Increasing the income of one generation without changing the
income of another generation also increases X.
The measure also permits a trade-off between efficiency and equality.
The exact trade-off is determined by the assignment of weights. X is
affected equally by a one unit change in y. and w./w. unit change in YJ.'
1 1 J
provided that the rankings of y. and y. remain unaltered.
1 J
2.3 The price of equality -- redistribution
Increased provision of the public good requires a redistribution of
income across generations. If each generation's endowment is taxed at the
same rate to provide a pool from which income is distributed equally to all
generations, the price that each generation faces for the public good does
not vary as provision of the public good is changed.II Therefore. the
opportunity locus facing each generation can be expressed follows:
PiX+Yi=PiX'+Ei fori=1,2•...• n. (3)
in which Pi is the price of the public good to the ith
generation, in terms of its own income.
X' is the endowment of the public good. and
Ei is generation i's endowed income.
Figure 1 illustrates possible opportunity loci facing four different
generations. Representative endowments of personal wealth for generations- 6 -
A, B, C, and Dare Ea, Eb, Ec' and Ed respectively. By definition, each
generation has the same endowment of the public good, X'. The opportunity
locus facing each generation passes through that generation's endowment,
has a slope of -Pi and terminates at the distribution in which all incomes
are equal.~/ As shown, a generation with a greater endowment faces a
higher price for the public good than does a generation with a smaller
endowment.
A generation with less than the mean endowment could suffer reduced
income as the provision of the public good is increased. Redistribution
toward equality could reduce the average income. In the intragenerational
context, the costs of redistribution are described as arising from a loss
of market incentives to produce income. In this intergenerational model,
redistribution toward equality reduces the average income because the shift
of income from wealthier, future generations to the present involves
foregoing some investment gains. A generation with an endowment below the
income that each generation receives when income is distributed equally
will receive greater income as provision of the public good is increased
and, therefore, faces a negative price for the public good.
Interestingly, the price of the public good for each generation also
reflects the weights used to construct the income distribution measure.
The desire for a more equal distribution of income between generations is
reflected by larger weights for low incomes and smaller weights for high
incomes. In general, the more egalitarian the intent in assigning the,
weights, the smaller the value of X for a given distribution of income, and
the lower the price of the public good.• - 7 -
2.4 Individual preferences over the distribution of income
In choosing the amount of the public good it most prefers, each
generation maximizes its utility subject to the budget constraint that it
faces. For each generation, maximization of (1) subject to (3) yields the




in which y*i and X*i are the optimal quantities of Yi and X
for the ith generation, and
~* is the income that each generation receives when
income is distributed equally.
(5)
An evaluation of the Kuhn-Tucker conditions reveals that the amount of
the public good that each generation prefers depends on the price that it
faces for the public good and on the tastes for X and Yi' These tastes can
be expressed in terms of preferred income distributions. If 6/(1-6) < Pi
is true, then the relative intensity of desire for income equality is less
than the price that the lth generation faces for the public good, and that
generation most prefers an income distribution in which Yi is greater than
X-- a distribution with some inequality. On the other hand, if 0/(1-6) ~- 8 -
Pi is true, then the relative intensity of desire for income equality is
greater than, or equal to, the price that the ith generation faces for the
public good, and that generation most prefers a distribution in which Yi
equals X-- a distribution with complete equality.
Because all generations with an endowment less than ~* face a negative
price for X, these generations favor a redistribution of income to complete
equality as a corner solution. Each generation with an endowment greater
than ~* may favor complete equality as a corner solution, complete equality
as an interior solution, or less than complete equality as an interior
solution.
2.5. Majority rule and the median generation
Given single-peaked preferences over the amount of the public good to
be provided, majority rule maximizes the utility of the generation whose
most preferred amount of the public good is median.9! Therefore, evaluated
for this median generation, the Kuhn-Tucker conditions (4) and (5) express
the outcome of the majority rule. This median generation is a future
generation with an endowment that is median or greater.
Evaluation of the Kuhn-Tucker conditions (4) and (5) for the median
voter reveals that the greater the relative intensity of desire for X· the
more equal the income distribution selected by majority rule.
Specifically, if the relative intensity of desire for income equality is
less than the price that the median voter faces for the public good,
majority rule results in inequality because the median generation most
prefers a distribution in which its own income is greater than X. On the
•- 9 -
other hand, if the relative intensity of desire for income equality is
greater than, or equal to, the price that the median voter faces for the
public good, majority rule results in a completely equal distribution of
income because the median generation most prefers a distribution in which
its own income equals X.101
Because all generations have identical tastes, the voter with median
preferences for the amount of the public good to be provided can be
identified by the price it faces for the public good.IlI Given the normal
assumption that the substitution effect dominates the income effect, the
amount of the public good most preferred declines as larger Pi are
examined. In this case, the voter with median preferences for the public
good faces the median price and has the median endowment. If the income
effect dominates the substitution effect at sufficiently high values of Pi'
the preferred amount of the public good rises with income and price. In
this case, the voter with median preferences for the public good faces a
higher than median price and has an endowment that is greater than
median. 121
3. Tastes and Marginal Rates of Time Preference under Majority Rule
To investigate the relationship between individual tastes and a
majority rule that exhibits a positive marginal rate of time preference for
all distributions in which each generation is wealthier than those
preceding it, I examine three cases. The cases are as follows:
Case 1. 6/(1-6) < P at a zero discount rate. m- 10 -
Case 2. 1i/(1-Ii) > P at a zero discount rate. m
Case 3. 1i/(1-Ii) = P at a zero discount rate. m
The difference in these cases are the assumed tastes for X and Yi. Cases 2
and 3 represent more egalitarian tastes than does case 1 because in these
cases there is a greater preference for X over Yi. For each of these
cases, I derive the marginal rates of time preference that the majority
rule associates with various distributions of income. I then inspect the
distributions and their associated marginal rates of time preference to
determine for what taste assumptions the majority rule will exhibit a
positive marginal rate of time preference for all distributions in which
each generation is wealthier than those preceding it.
The indifference curve in Figure 2 illustrates the first case -- the
one in which tastes are least egalitarian. Points A, Band C in Figure 2
represent three consumption combinations of Ymand X that are on the same
indifference curve for the median voter. A unique distribution of income
is associated with each point along the indifference curve. The income
distributions associated with these combinations form a social choice
contour because the median voter is indifferent between the combinations of
Ymand X along the curve.
By construction, a zero discount rate underlies the opportunity locus
tangent to the indifference curve at point A. Majority rule yields some
inequality at a zero discount rate. Because this distribution resulted
from a zero discount rate, for this distribution of income, the marginal
rate of time preference of the majority rule must be zero.
••
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Increasing the discount rate increases the price of X for the median
voter.13/ And with the median voter facing a higher price for X, majority
rule results in a smaller provision of X and a less equal distribution of
income.14/ The difference between point B and point A in Figure 2
illustrates the effect of increasing the discount rate. A positive
discount rate is required to make the distribution of income associated
with point B the majority choice. Consequently, for this distribution of
income, the marginal rate of time preference is positive.
Point C in Figure 2 is associated with a more equal distribution of
income than is point A. A negative discount rate is required to make the
distribution associated with point C the majority choice. Consequently,
for this distribution of income, the marginal rate of time preference is
negative.
Figure 3 presents an index of income equality and corresponding
marginal rates of time preference. In Figure 3, income equality is
measured by the index X/~, where ~ is the mean income. At its maximum
value of one, the index denotes complete income equality. Points A, Band
C in Figure 3(a) represent, respectively, the same distributions of income
as points A, Band C in Figure 2.
If tastes are not very egalitarian, the majority rule does not exhibit
a positive marginal rate of time preference for all distributions in which
each generation is wealthier than those preceding it, as is shown in Figure
3(a). In case 1, zero and negative marginal rates of time preference are
exhibited for some distributions in which each generation is wealthier than
those preceding it.- 12 -
If tastes are sufficiently egalitarian, the majority rule will exhibit
a positive marginal rate of time preference for all distributions in which
each generation is wealthier than those preceding it. As shown in Figure
3, cases 2 and 3 do represent sufficiently egalitarian tastes. For these
cases, the median voter most prefers income equality when confronted with
redistribution at a zero discount rate. In Figures 3(b) and 3(c), the
effects of sufficiently egalitarian tastes are evidenced as a zero marginal
rate of time preference at a completely equal distribution of income. For
all distributions in which there is inequality, a positive marginal rate of
time preference is exhibited.~/
These three cases indicate the potential importance of egalitarian
tastes to Tullock's justification of discounting. If assumed tastes are
not sufficiently egalitarian, the majority rule exhibits zero and negative
marginal rates of time preference for some income distributions in which
each generation is wealthier than those preceding it. Only if the assumed
tastes are sufficiently egalitarian does the majority rule exhibit a
positive marginal rate of time preference for all income distributions in
which each generation is wealthier than those preceding it.
4. Conclusion: Egalitarian Tastes and The Fairness of Discounting
An intergenerational majority rule over the distribution of income is,
of course, hypothetical. Most decisions regarding the intergenerational
distribution of income must be made before most of the voters would be able




useful as a gUide to public policy. The present generation could be
concerned with how future generations will view the fairness of current
decisions.
The more egalitarian the tastes of future generations, the more fair
they will consider increased consumption by the poorest generation -- which
we assume is the present generation. Because future generations are our
offspring, their tastes will be shaped by our tastes. The more egalitarian
are the present generation's tastes, the more income it can justify to
future generations in claiming for itself.
Discounting can be an expression of egalitarian tastes if each
generation is wealthier than those preceding. Discounting gives greater
weight to changes in the income of earlier generations than it does to
changes in the income of later generations. In the model presented here,
egalitarian tastes are required for discounting to be justified by the
simple expectation that each generation is wealthier than those preceding
it. Only if tastes are strongly egalitarian does the majority rule exhibit
a positive marginal rate of time preference for all distributions in which
each generation is wealthier than those preceding it.
Post Script: The Logic of Tullock's Position
The above exercises may have a direct bearing on the logical foundation
of Professor Tullock's position. He argued that because future generations
will be wealthier than the present generation, a positive social rate of
discount is justified. This argument appeals to some underlying -- albeit- 14 -
unknown -- social choice rule. Given that egalitarian tastes underlie a
simple majority rule that exhibits a positive marginal rate of time
preference, it is tempting to conclude that Professor Tullock is very
egalitarian. A more circumspect conclusion, however, would note that other







Those who have addressed this issue include F. P. Ramsey (1928), A.C.
Pigou (1932), Stephen Marglin (1963) and Gordon Tullock (1964).
2. Those who have addressed this more recent issue include Robert Solow
(1974), Talbot Page (1977), Martin J. Bailey (1979) and Robert A.
Becker (1982).
3. In fairness to Professor Tullock, it should be noted that he was not
attempting to develop a social welfare function, but merely pointing
out that individuals would be unlikely to prefer a redistribution of
income away from themselves to those with greater wealth.
4. This approach eliminates simultaneous consideration of the
intergenerational and intragenerational aspects of the income
distribution. In taking this approach, I ignore the possibility that
the poorest individual to ever exist may be a member of the wealthiest
generation.
5. The results obtained in a single good model can be generalized to a
multiple good world. An efficiently composed bundle of goods for a
given generation is obtained when the same discount rate is applied to
all of the goods in that generation's bundle. S. P. A. Brown (1979)
discusses this issue in further detail.
6. This construction of Xalso has the desirable property of making it
linear in the Yi' Given the single parameter redistribution formula
used below, a linear opportunity locus is obtained for each generation.- 16 -
7. A single parameter redistribution formula is used because it results in
non-cyclic voting. Given a restriction that the tax rate not exceed
one, this redistribution formula yields a linear mapping between y. and
1
X for each generation. Single-peaked preferences result because each
generation's utility function is convex to the origin.
Under the single parameter redistribution formula the price of X
is strictly a function of constants. Each generation receives an
income of Yi = t~* + (l-t)Ei ; where t is the tax rate at which each
generation's endowment is taxed to provide a pool for redistribution
and ~* is the income that each generation would receive when income is
distributed equally. The amount of the public good corresponding to a
given tax rate is X= t~* + (l-t)X'; where X' is the endowment of the
public good. The price of the public good for the lth generation is
the net amount of its own wealth that it must sacrifice for one unit of
the public good. Mathematically, the price of X for generation 1 is Pi
= -(aYi/at)/(aX/at) = -(~*-Ei)/(~*-X').
This construction assumes that the loss in total income resulting
from redistribution is proportional to t. Also note that generation i
faces a net tax rate of t(l - ~*/Ei) on its endowment.
8. At tax rates exceeding one, the relative ranking of income assignments
is reversed, violating a necessary restriction that the relative
ranking of each generation's income be preserved. This restriction
does not impair the overall analysis because inquiry is directed at
determining the fairness of discounting when each generation is






Also note that redistribution toward the wealthy must end when the
income of the poorest generation goes to zero. This occurs at a tax
rate of 1 - ~*/(~*-E1)'
9. Duncan Black (1958) has shown that single-peaked preferences result in
a consistent majority rule in which the social choice is that of the
median voter.
10. If the median voter has an endowment below ~*, majority rule results in
complete equality of income -- regardless of assumed tastes.
11. Under the budget constraint, the effects of differing endowments are
incorporated as differing prices.
12. If a > 1, then aX*/aP. < 0 for all P.. If a < 1, then aX*/aP. is " ,
negative if Pi is sufficiently low for the generations with the
greatest endowments and 6/(1-6) is sufficiently high. An elasticity of
substitution of less than one can result in a negative relationship
between X* and P. because aX*/aP. is the rate of change in the price , ,
expansion path about the point (~*,~*) -- not a point for which Yi
equals zero.
13. The chain rule is used to determine the sign of aPm/ar. Because
aPm/a~* and a~*/ar are both negative, their product is positive.
For the median generation, the derivative of price with respect to
~* is (X'-Em)/(X,-~*)2. Because the denominator of this expression is
positive, the sign of aPi/a~* depends on the sign of the numerator. It
is reasonable to assume that the median generation's own income
endowment (Em) is greater than the endowment of the public good (X').
Therefore, the numerator and aP /a~* are negative. m- 18 -
That av*/ar is negative is best explained intuitively. If the
•
•
only cost of redistribution is foregone investment opportunities. v* is
-i+l i+l . calculated as: v* = [rEi(l+r) J / [r(l+r) J. where r 1S the
discount rate and summation here is from 1 to n and over i. As the
discount rate is increased, the amount of income transferred to earlier
generations for a each dollar taken from a later generation is reduced.
Because the incomes of earlier generations rise more slowly for a given
reduction of later generation income, the income gap between
generations is closed more slowly as t is increased. Therefore, more
income must be taken from later generations to equalize the
distribution of income and v* is reduced.
Formal proof that av*/ar is negative is somewhat involved. In the
interest of conserving space, the proof has been confined to an
appendix that is available from the author.
14. For the median voter, a(x* /y* )/ap < O. m m m
15. If tastes are very egalitarian, however, positive marginal rates of
time preference can also be associated with an equal distribution of
income, as is shown in Figure 3(b). Nevertheless, once a high enough
value of r is reached, higher marginal rates of time preference are
associated with less equal distributions of income. In the third case,
this threshold value occurs at a zero marginal rate of time preference.•
Bailey, Martin J. (1979).
University of Maryland:




The Discount Rate in Benefit Cost Analysis.
Department of Economics Working Paper 79-18.
Intergenerational Equity: The Capital-






Black, Duncan (1958). The Theory of Committees and Elections. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Brown, S. P. A. (1979). Public Choice, Intergenerational Equity and the
Social Rate of Discount. University of Maryland: Ph.D. dissertation.
Hamada, Koichi (1973). A Simple Majority Rule on the Distribution of
Income. Journal of Economic Theory 6 (3): 243-264.
Marglin, Stephen (1963). The Social Rate of Discount and the Optimal Rate
of Investment. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 77 (1): 95-111
Page, Talbot (1977). Conservation and Economic Efficiency. Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins University Press for Resources for the Future.
Pigou, A. C. (1932). The Economics of Welfare. London: Macmillan.
Ramsey, F. P. (1928). A Mathematical Theory of Saving. Economic Journal
38 (152): 543-559.
Solow, Robert M. (1974). Intergenerational Equity and Exhaustible
Resources. Review of Economic Studies Symposium:' 29-45.
Thurow, Lester C. (1971). The Income Distribution as a Pure Public Good.
Quarterly Journal of Economics 85 (2): 327-336.- 20 -
Tullock, Gordon (1964). The Social Rate of Discount and the Optimal Rate












" ,- ,- ,-



















Figure 1 Four possible budget constraints
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Figure 3 Discount rales and optimal Income distributions